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of the illicit relationship since there was no marriage and no
putative marriage. The court stated that while concubines may
assert legal claims arising out of business transaction between
them, "strict and conclusive proof" 2 must be established which
was lacking to support plaintiff's plea.
In Cotton v. Wright88 the court pointed out that a judgment
for separation of bed and board dissolves the community which
is not reconstituted upon reconciliation of the spouses unless
the spouses reestablish it by notarial act under Act 200 of 1944
amending Article 155 of the Revised Civil Code.
The court held in Parker, Seale & Kelton v. Messina 4 that
when a suit by a wife for separation of bed and board is unsuc-
cessful and the community of course is not dissolved, the attorney
for the wife has a cause of action against the husband, head of
the community, for fees upon a quantum merit basis, as the obli-
gation is one which the community must assume.
MINERAL RIGHTS
Harriet S. Daggett*
Servitude
The court held in Ober v. Williams' that a conditional prom-
ise to sell did not have the effect of a sale even after the condi-
tions were performed by the prospective buyer nor until the
deed translative of title was passed. Neither did the eventual
sale have retrospective effect. Thus, the mineral servitude in-
volved was not created until the title was transferred and pre-
scription did not begin to run until that date.
Public policy was urged against the decision and fears ex-
pressed that minerals would be held in this fashion by contracts
to sell. The court stated that if and when the contract was used
for this purpose, it would be dealt with.
The effect of an acknowledgment was at issue in James v.
Noble.2 The intent and purpose of the paper was clearly to inter-
rupt prescription against a mineral servitude. Since minors were
holding the servitude, counsel for the plaintiff, landowner, and
maker of the acknowledgment pleaded that the acknowledgment
32. 212 La. 685, 689, 33 So. (2d) 196, 197 (1947).
33. 36 So. (2d) 713 (La. 1948).
34. 36 So. (2d) 724 (La. 1948).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 213 La. 568, 35 So. (2d) 219 (1948).
2. 36 So.(2d) 722 (La. 1948).
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was rendered null by the passage of Act 232 of 1944,8 which was
specifically applicable to existing rights and denied suspension
of prescription to the major co-owner of persons enjoying it
because of a legal disability. The court found that the statute
had no application to this issue since the rights were in effect
by virtue of the acknowledgment which started a new period of
prescription and the rights of the parties were not presently de-
pendent upon interruption of prescription. The court found the
acknowledgment valid without consideration under Article 3520
of the Civil Code which provides that prescription is interrupted
when the debtor or possessor acknowledges the right of the per-
son whose title they prescribe.
It would seem that a distinction might be made between
acknowledgment of debt and ordinary title, and of a mineral
servitude. Where the arbitrary rule of the law of prescription
merely cuts off the right of the creditor and true owner to com-
plain, the acknowledgment is supported by the consideration
of the natural obligation involved to pay the still existing debt
or return the property to the still existing true owner. Also, in
the second case, the acknowledgor has relief against his vendor.
Acknowledgment of a mineral servitude creates another ten year
term within which the owner of the right may take the most
valuable part of the realty. No natural obligation rests upon the
landowner to grant the right for a second time, when the grantee
has had ample opportunity to exert it within the originally pur-
chased period. It is illogical to assume that a grantor would care
to make a gift of such a valuable possession. Certainly the sug-
gested distinction would have to be made on the basis of the
peculiar nature of the mineral servitude as the instant decision
on acknowledgments in general and indeed, for mineral servi-
tudes, expresses the rule as presently evolved.
The court held in Holcombe v. Superior Oil Company4 that
the owner of a mineral servitude, a real right, is entitled to
damages for an invasion of this right by an unauthorized geo-
physical survey of the lands subject to the servitude. Compen-
satory damages, in the sum of five dollars an acre were found
reasonable, based on leasing values in the area paid by the de-
fendant, since the leases were found to have been in reality for
the purpose of surveys. The land in question was nearer to known
oil lands and hence entitled in damages, to the highest price paid
3. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1947) §§ 4826.3-4826.4.
4. 213 La. 684, 35 So.(2d) 457 (1948).
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for leases. The matter of disclosure of information was not dis-
cussed.5
An extended discussion of Byrd v. Forgotson6 and Ohio Oil
Company v. Ferguson7 appears in a previous issue of this jour-
nal.8 Space does not allow a second resum6 of the materials.
Royalty per se
In Gulf Refining Company v. Goode9 the following excerpt
from a deed was interpreted to be a reservation of Vincent-Bul-
lock type royalty: "'Said Mrs. Edna Gibson retains 1/64th royalty
in all oil, gas and mineral rights in the above described lands'.'
This right to production had prescribed. Opponents unsuccess-
fully attempted to prove that the reservation created a mineral
serviture and various documents were produced as evidence of
the intention of the parties.
An extended discussion of the most interesting materials
contained in St. Martin Land Company v. Pinckney," Union
Sulphur Company, Incorporated v. Longnion,"2 and Humble Oil
& Refining Company v. Guillory3 appears in a previous issue
of this journal 4 hence space will not be used here for repetitious
statements.
Lease
The suit in Carter v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company5 was
to cancel a lease for failure to develop adequately the area. The
defense attempted to make a distinction between development
and exploration. They produced evidence of a fault and had
relied upon the advice of their geologist in not drilling the acre-
age on the down-throw side of the fault as the probabilities were
against production. Evidence by various geologists did not dis-
close that there was by any means a certainty that production
5. See La. Act 205 of 1938; Art. 1934, La. Civil Code of 1870; Layne La.
Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 209 La. 1014, 26 So.(2d) 20 (1946); Angelloz v. Humble
Oil & Refining Co., 196 La. 604, 199 So. 656 (1940).
6. 213 La. 276, 34 So.(2d) 777 (1945).
7. 213 La. 183, 34 So.(2d) 746 (1946)(on rehearing 1947).
8. Byrd v. Forgotson, 213 La. 276, 34 So.(2d) 777 (1945), noted in (1948)
8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 536, and Ohio Oil Co. v. Ferguson, 213 La. 183, 34
So.(2d) 746 (1946), noted in (1948) 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 536.
9. 212 La. 502, 32 So.(2d) 904 (1947).
10. 212 La. 502, 504, 32 So.(2d) 904, 905.
11. 212 La. 605, 33 So.(2d) 169 (1947).
12. 212 La. 632, 33 So.(2d) 178 (1947).
13. 212 La. 646, 33 So.(2d) 182 (1947).
14. Daggett, Sequels to Vincent v. Bullock (1948) 8 LOUISIANA LAW RE-
VIEW 174.
15. 36 So.(2d) 26 (La. 1948).
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might not occur in the undeveloped area. A producer's agree-
ment was in effect and only about a third of the area of plaintiff's
lease was receiving the allocation by acreage. Obviously plain-
tiffs were not bound by this contract. No orders of the conserva-
tion department had been issued regarding the area. The court
pointed out that no definite rule could be laid down concerning
diligent development clauses and each case had to be decided on
its facts. The decision was that the lessee had no right to hold
acreage indefinitely without regard to the lessor's interest and
the lease was cancelled except for the twenty-five acres to be
retained by the lessee around each producing well as specifically
provided by the lease. The idea that there is an implied obliga-
tion to develop or test every part of the area was stressed.16
In Jones v. Southern Natural Gas Company17 the lessor sued
for cancellation and attorney's fees under Act 168 of 1920. After
careful review of lengthy testimony, the majority of the court
found that the failure of the lessee to pay delay rentals in proper
amount had been due to a mutual mistake and one "which was
very apt to occur" and hence the lower court was reversed and
the lease was not cancelled. The leading opinion by Chief Justice
O'Niell stated that in some respects the decision was at variance
with statements made in LeRosen v. North Central Texas Oil
Company'8 and so far as the inconsistencies existed the LeRosen
case was overruled. Justice Fournet concurred, grounding his
opinion on estoppel. Justice Hawthorne dissented, maintaining
that the majority had failed to distinguish between the "drill or
pay" type and the "unless" type of lease, a classification into
which the instant case fitted. Furthermore, Justice Hawthorne
felt that the mistake was not "pardonable" in that the lessee
could have controlled it and that it was not "mutual" as the
lessor did not know that the lessee believed the payment to have
been sufficient.
Justice McCaleb also dissented feeling that equitable abhor-
rence of forfeiture should not have guided the court as the terms
of the instrument were clear and the lease was dissolved under
its own provisions. He further believed that an undue burden of
knowledge and action, not found in the contract, had been placed
on the lessor.
16. See Sauder, Administratrix v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 292
U. S. 272, 54 S.Ct. 671, 78 L.Ed. 1255, 93 A.L.R. 454 (1933), rehearing denied
292 U. S. 613, 43 S.Ct. 856, 78 L.Ed. 1472 (1934).
17. 36 So.(2d) 34 (La. 1948).
18. 169 La. 973, 126 So. 442 (1930).
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A lease had expired under its own terms, no drilling opera-
tions having commenced within the period stipulated. However,
the lessee dealt with the lease and a well was drilled which was
unproductive. In Matheson v. Placid Oil Company1 9 the land
owner sued for damages and the court awarded the value of the
lease plus a sum for physical damage to the land.
Most interesting procedural questions were raised in Stacy
v. Midstates Oil Corporation20 and are discussed elsewhere in
this resum6 of jurisprudence. 21 The point of importance in min-
eral rights was the statement regarding the test of differentiation
between an assignment and a sublease. On the first hearing the
court recognized the established rule that retention of control
by the original lessee when he transfers part of the area under
his lease, stamps the transaction as a sublease. Finding a spe-
cific clause in the instrument relinquishing all control by the
original lessee, the court declared the transaction to be an
assignment, even though an overriding royalty had been re-
tained. This matter was not discussed on the rehearing as the
suit was dismissed because the majority of the court found that
the petition failed to state a cause of action. The Chief Justice,
author of the opinion on the first hearing, adhered to his view
that the petition, together with the documents made a part
thereof, did disclose a cause of action.
Justice McCaleb thought that while the petition did not
state a cause of action, the plaintiffs should have been permitted
to amend their pleadings rather than have their suit dismissed,
as the exception was in reality but one of vagueness, since insuffi-
ciency of allegations was the defect. It would seem that the use
of Justice McCaleb's suggestion would go far toward mitigating
the hardships of expense and delay, a major criticism by the
public of legal processes.
The Nebo Oil Company leased certain lands to the Little
Creek Oil Company. In Whitney National Bank of New Orleans
v. Little Creek Oil Company, Incorporated,22 the Little Creek Oil
Company asked for cancellation of lease and return of considera-
tion, contending that the lessor's mineral rights had prescribed.
The contention of the lessor was that the rights were not pre-
scriptable under Act 315 of 1940, which purported prevention of
acquisition of minerals by the United States by reversion to lands
19. 212 La. 807, 33 So.(2d) 527 (1947).
20. 36 So.(2d) 714 (La. 1948).
21. See 1p. 235, infra.
22. 212 La. 949, 33 So.(2d) 693 (1947).
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acquired by the United States both before and after the passage
of the act, and in which mineral rights had been reserved. Pleas
of unconstitutionality of the act were entered. Should the statute
be given a retroactive effect, the United States would be injured
and hence was a necessary party in the court's judgment. Since
the title to the minerals was "clearly suggestive of litigation '2 3
the court felt that it would be inequitable to force title on the
Little Creek Company as the constitutional point could not be
passed upon. The suit therefore was dismissed for non-joinder of
necessary parties. Justice McCaleb dissented, believing with the
majority that the Little Creek Company was without interest to
question the constitutionality of the act, but concluding that since
the Little Creek Company had not refused title on the ground of
its being suggestive of litigation, they should take the lease.
PERSONS
Robert A. Pascal*
Marriage
The appeal in Villa v. LaCoste,' a suit for declaration of nul-
lity of marriage on the ground of miscegenation, was easily
disposed of by affirmance of the negative finding of the lower
court on this issue. It is interesting to note, however, that the
"white" plaintiff not only sued for a declaration of nullity, but
also sought "to disclaim the paternity and legitimacy" of the
issue of the marriage. Inasmuch as he apparently did not set
forth "bad faith" on the part of himself and his spouse, the plain-
tiff's prayer must have been based on the assumption that a mis-
cegenous union cannot be putative. The writer cannot agree
with this position. Article 94 of the Civil Code states that "such
celebration carries with it no effect and is null and void,"'2 but
these words should not be interpreted to exclude the effects,
including legitimacy of offspring, which flow because of the good
faith of the parties rather than from the "marriage" itself.3 The
23. 212 La. 949, 962, 33 So. (2d) 693, 697.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 213 La. 654, 35 So(2d) 419 (1948).
2. Art. 94, La. Civil Code of 1870, sentence 3 (added by La. Act 54 of
1894): "Marriage between white persons and persons of color is prohibited,
and the celebration of all such marriages is forbidden and such celebration
carries with it no effect and is null and void."
3. Arts. 117 and 118, La. Civil Code of 1870:
Art. 117. "The marriage, which has been declared null, produces never-
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